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METHOD TO THEIR MADNESS:
DISPELLING THE MYTH OF
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY
AS A BEHAVIORAL IDEAL
John Dobson
ABSTRACT
Although not immediately apparent, the discipline of behavioral finance is
rapidly adopting an implicit prescriptive agenda. Behavioralfinance does not
merely describe financial market reality, it shapes it. Economic rationality is
taken as the ideal toward to which individuals 'should' strive.
In this paper I show that, as a behavioral ideal, economic rationality
is unjustified both from a strictly economic perspective, and from a moral
perspective. In short, there is nothing inherently "wrong" with economically
irrational participants in the business environment. Indeed such participants
will actually enhance the efficiency, and the ethicality, of business.

1. INTRODUCTION
rationality itself. v,'hether theoretical or practical, is a concept with a history: indeed. since
there are a diversity of traditions of enquiry, with histones, there are ... rationalities rather
than rationality (Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which rationality, 1988, p. 9).
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The rapidly growing discipline of behavioral finance is generally viewed as a
value-free descriptive subject that makes no pronouncements on how agents
"should" behave. Behavioral finance, most academics and practitioners would
argue, attempts merely to describe and account for how individuals and groups
actually behave in financial environments. In other words. the general consensus is that "behavioral finance" implies no particular moral or ethical
agenda.
On closer inspection, however, behavioral finance does espouse a .- "escriptive
ideal of how economic agents "should" behave. Consider the following statement
in a recent behavioral finance article that appeared in the Financial Analysts
Journal: "The way the world should be (the rational economic paradigm) and
the way the world is (behavioral tendencies) will always be in tension, but the
introduction of psychological antecedents into the analysis of financial anomalies
is not a negation of the rational economic paradigm". Note the view that the way
individuals "should" behave in financial markets is in a manner consistent with the
rational economic paradigm. The authors compound this implication by referring
to behavior that is inconsistent with economic rationality as "errant" (p. 56)
behavior.
Many other financial economists who write about behavioral finance seem
to think. it natural to set up a dichotomy between actual observed behavior on
the one hand, versus some behavioral ideal on the other; where the behavioral
ideal comes from financial-economic theory's concept of rationality. Financial
economists often refer to irrational behavior as behavior "off the equilibrium
path", as if those individuals who behave irrationally are in some way straying or
deviating from an ideal route.
Even in the formative stages of the discipline, therefore, behavioral finance has
adopted a normative (i.e. prescriptive) agenda. Behavioral finance is not merely
about the application of the theories and methodology of psychology in an attempt
to explain behavior. Albeit implicitly, behavioral finance is also about prescribing
how agents should behave: agents should behave rationally, where rationality is
defined strictly in terms of financial economic theory.
In this paper I analyze behavioral finance's implicit normative agenda. Specifically, I argue that it is unjustified and injustifiable from both an economic and a
moral perspective to espouse financial-economic rationality as a behavioral ideal.
In short, there is no meaningful way in which we can say that investors, managers,
brokers, or anyone else for that matter "should" behave in a way consistent with
economic rationality.
The remainder of the paper is split into three parts. First, I describe exactly what
is meant by financial-economic rationality. Second, I show why such a rationality
concept is unjustified as a normative ideal from a strictly economic perspective.

Third. I show why such a rationality concept is injustitiable as a normative ideal
from a strictly moral perspective.

2. WHO IS THE RATIONAL AGENT IN
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS?
Rationality in financial economics is founded on the five axioms of cardinal utility,
as first enumerated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), plus one additional
axiom. These original five axioms are comparability, consistency, independence,
measurability, and ranking:
• comparability; the individual can make comparisons between preferences.
• consistency; these comparisons are consistent over an array of alternatives.
• independence; original preference orderings are independent of new preference
alternatives.
• measurability; preferences are measurable.
• ranking; preferences can be consistently and ordinally ranked.
In essence, the five axioms define rationality in terms of an individual's ability to
make consistent preference orderings over a broad spectrum of choices: "We wish
to find the mathematically cumplete principles which define "rational behavior'·
for the participants in a social economy, and derive from them the general
characteristics of that behavior" (p. 31). Furthermore, "people are assumed to be
able to make these rational choices among thousands of alternatives" (Copeland &
Weston, 1988, p. 80).
The axioms are thus based on a very mathematical and instrumental notion of
what it means to be rational: they are all concerned with defining instrumental
rationality in terms of the consistent ranking of preferences. For example, if you
are an investor choosing stocks in which to invest, and you prefer IBM to Microsoft,
and you prefer Microsoft to Netscape, then to be rational you must prefer IBM to
Netscape; furthermore your degree of preference for IBM over Netscape, along
with your preferences for thousands of other securities, must stay constant no
matter how many more stocks are added to your opportunity set.
Note that these five axioms make no normative statement concerning whether
the agent has any specific goal, or what the goal of the agent should be; the axioms
simply require that the agent act in a consistent manner in ordering preferences.
Financial-economic theory's sixth axiom, however, has just such prescriptive
implications. As Thomas Copeland and Fred Weston's leading finance text puts it:
"Having established the five axioms we add to them the assumption that individuals
always prefer more wealth to less" (1988, p. 80, my emphasis). Personal wealth
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maximization is thus a rational agent's sine qua non: no matter what the context
no other ultimate objective is allowed or considered.
In relating the five axioms to this sixth axiom. a useful distinction can
be made between instrumental rationality and substantive rationality. In The
Protestant EThic and The Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber made this distinction
in labelling two types of rationality as "zweckrationalitat" (formal or instrumental
rationality) and "wertrarationalitat" (values-based or substantive rationality). In
essence, instrumental rationality concerns how the agent goes about achieving the
desired objective, whereas substantive rationality concerns identifying the desired
objective itself. Jennifer Moore distinguishes between the two concepts as follows:
The primary feature of instrumental rationality is that it does not choose ends, but accepts them
as given and looks for the best means to achieve them. In instrumental rationality, reason is
subordinated to and placed at the service of ends outside itself. In ... [suhstonlive rationalitvl,
in contrast reason is free ranging. It is not the servant of any end. Rather, it subjects every end
to its own standards of evaluation and criticism (1991, p. 63).

von Neumann and Morgenstern's five axioms clearly pertain to instrumental
rationality. They do not stipulate an ultimate objective but merely require that
agents pursue some given objective in a consistent and logical manner. The
substantive rationality premise of financial economics is provided by the sixth
axiom: the opportunistic and atomistic pursuit of material gain ad infinitum. No
justification is supplied in the finance literature in the form of empirical evidence
to support this substantive rationality premise (indeed there is ample evidence that
in many environments individuals are not motivated primarily by personal wealth
maximization); nor is any normative argument supplied to defend the notion that
this is how agents should behave.
The six axioms are merely a framing effect: a way of placing behavior in a
relatively simple mathematical context. They make no claim to factual accuracy
in all situations, or even in most situations, in which finance professionals find
themselves. Nor are the axioms meant to make any moral claim to the effect
that this is how individuals should behave in any given situation. As John
Boatright observes: "Economics does not make any value judgement about the
goods that people prefer or about the selfishness that is assumed" (1999, p. 48).
Financial-economic rationality is a simplifying assumption, and nothing more.

3. WHY THE "RATIONAL" AGENT CANNOT BE
VIEWED AS AN ECONOMIC IDEAL
I carved a massive cake of beeswax into bits and rolled them in my hands until they softened.
Going forward I carried wax along the line. and laid it thick on their ears. They tied me up, then.

plumh amidships, back to the mast, lashed to the mast, and took themselves again to rowing.
Soon, as we came smartly within hailing distance. the two Sirens. noting our fast ship otl their
point. made ready, and they sang ... The lovely voices in ardor appealing over the ,vater made
me crave to listen, and I tried to say 'Cntie m~!' tu the <:n:;w, Jerking my broVvs; but they hent
steady to the oars (Homer. c. -900. pp. 227-228).

A significant contributor to the canon of financial-economic theory is Stewart
Myers. In "The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing" (1977), Myers employs
the above excerpt from Homer's Odyssey to illustrate the paradoxical nature
of rationality in financial economics. The Sirens' song in financial economics
is the opportunistic pursuit of personal material gain. The term "opportunistic"
implies that the agent will do whatever is necessary in the interests of this pursuit.
The agent will lie, cheat, steal, etc.. so long as this behavior is construed as
wealth maximizing. Agents are "lashed to the mast" in the sense that they are
assumed always to act opprtunistically. In Myers' model of equilibrium in debt
markets, for example, borrowers pay a higher interest rate in order to compensate
lenders for the assumed opportunism of borrowers: borrowers will renege on loan
agreements as soon as it is in their material self-interest to do so. There is no
"benefit-of-the-doubt" given here, opportunistic wealth maximization (i.e. the six
axioms) is the only rationality premise considered.
What is important to note here is that no one actually gains from this opportunistic wealth maximization; it is self-defeating. Returning to Myers' model, the
borrowers have to pay higher interest costs and so borrow less, which in turn hurts
the lenders. So economic rationality ensures that its own self-declared objective is
never attained: wealth is not maximized for borrowers, for lenders, or indeed for
the economy in aggregate. But why must this be so?
To answer this question we must look more closely at the behavior, and specifically the interaction. of these "rational" agents. To model behavior, Myers employs
game theory, and it is through applying game theory to financial markets ~ what
is generally called agency theory - that we can see the self-defeating nature of
economic rationality. Indeed, as a theoretical discipline, behavioral finance can
be seen as an application of agency theory. From its humble beginnings in the
corporate finance theory of Myers and others, the 1970s agency theory has now
become the predominant methodoloy of theoretical finance.
Agency theory analyses the situation, ubiquitous in financial markets, in which
"one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making
authority to the agent" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). These agency-theory
models can be loosely categorized into two types, namely adverse-selection and
moral-hazard. The difference between these two categories is essentially a function
of the nature and degree of uncertainty inherent in the contractual situation.
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Consider first moral-hazard-type agency problems, here the contractual situation is ostensibly a simpler one in which there is only one type of agent. There
may be no informational asymmetry and the agency problem may simply stem
from the principal's inability to control the actions of the agent. Or there may
be informational asymmetl)' in \vhich case the agency problem stems from the
principal's inability to observe directly some infonnation that affects the actions
or the performance of the agent (e.g. it might be hard for the principal to discern
whether a stockbroker was genuinely committed to executing a client's security
transaction at the best available price).
The classic agency problem of this type is managenal perquisite consumption.
As a finn moves from private to public ownership, there is a separation ofownership
and control. The owners bear the cost of managers' perquisite consumption (e.g.
business lunches. corporate jets, generous stock-option packages, etc.), but the
managers make the decisions on how many "perqs" to consume. Barring effective
accountability - in other words barring a resolution to the agency problem - a
"rational" wealth-maximizing management, who no longer bears the full cost of
its perqs, may be predisposed to consume perqs to an excessive degree: specifically,
to a degree that compromises the value ofthe finn as a whole. Potential shareholders
and bondholders, cognizant of management's "rational" predisposition, will lower
the price at which they are willing to buy the firm's equity or debt.
Once again, therefore, the cost of agency is invariably borne by the agent. Hence
the "finance paradox" that assumes agents are unable to resist the Sirens' Song of
opportunism, even though they must rationally realize that such a predisposition
is self-defeating. In short, a predisposition to opportunistic wealth maximization
does not maximize wealth for either the individual opportunist, or for the economy
in aggregate: it is second best.
This point is illustrated clearly by the following simple game.
Figure I illustrates a simple game between two players: "A" and "B". Each player
represents a stakeholder or group of stakeholders. So, for example, player "I" might
represent a group of shareholders considering an investment in a company whose
management is represented by player "B". David Kreps summarizes the game's
playas follows:
Firsl A must choose whether or not to trust his opponent. If he (A) elects not to trust B, then
both A and B get nothing. If he elects trust, B is made aware of this fact and is given the option
either to honor that trust or to abuse it. If A trusts B and she (B) chooses to honor that trust, both
get $10. But if A trusts B and she chooses to abuse ii, B gets $15 and A loses $5 (1984, p. 12).

Assume that each player's payoff from the game is common knowledge. In other
words there is no infonnational asymmetry and, to the extent that there is an agency
problem, it would be characterized as one of simple moral hazard. As Kreps
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A Game Tree Illustrating a Contractual Relation between Two Parties in which an
Inherent Conflict of Interest Exists.

explains, the game begins with player "A" deciding whether or not to trust player
"B". If he ("I") does decide to trust "B", then she ("B") must decide whether to
honor or abuse that trust. Readers familiar with Game Theory will recognize Fig. 1
as a one-sided version of the infamous Prisoners' Dilemma game. If we assume
that both players are rational and thus are primarily motivated to maximize their
payoff, then presumably, if called upon to move, "B" will abuse the trust vested
in her by "A". Realizing this, "A" will never offer trust and a contract between
these two players will not be entered into. The most "reasonable" outcome for
this game, therefore, is for each player to receive a payoff of $0. Formally, this is
the unique Nash equilibrium, in which each player's move is "rational" given the
move of the other player.
Such an outcome is clearly not the most desirable, however, either from the
point of view of the two players as individuals or from the point of view of the
economy as a whole, in that the maximum total payoff of $20 is not attained (this
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would be thcfirst-hest outcome). The unwillingness of player '"A" to trllst player
"B" has cost both players $10. But then why should "B" honor trust when her
immediate payoff is maximized by abusing it? And whatever "B" might actually
plan on doing. why should "A" assume "B" is going to honor trust when he can
see that abusing it yields her the higher payoff! In short, economically "rational"
agents are unable to reach the desirable outcome; once again simple self-interest
has proved self-defeating.
But, returning to Fig. L what if the game were repeated. In reality individuals
generally deal with one another more than once, and in such a repeated-game environment would not a rational agent now honor trust'? Thus. could not enlIghtened
self-interest thus overcome the contractual impasse?
This is the much vaunted "reputation solution" in game theory: the agent
honors trust and cooperates in order to build a reputation for cooperation. Game
theory, however, indicates that equilibria based on reputation are quite fragile. In
the context of Fig. I, for example, Dave Kreps shows that reputation will enforce
a contract between the two players only when there is some uncertainty about
the length of the game (i.e. the number of iterations), or when there is uncertainty
about tbe rationality of one o!"the players (i.e. whetber they are both self-interested
wealth maximizers). Indeed, even when one of these conditions is met, the agent's
desire to maintain her reputation may induce her to honor the contract only
some of the time. Similarly, in one of the most extensive game-theory models
yet developed - namely Diamond's (1989) model of reputation acquisition in
debt markets - agents never actively strive to build reputations. Some merely
acquire reputations for timely debt repayment through luck. Once acquired these
reputations may be actively maintained until the endgame is reached: at which
point agents revert to opportunistic behavior.
The economic undesirability of "rational" self-interest becomes even more
apparent when we consider adverse-selection, where the uncertainty stems from an
asymmetry of information that precludes the principal from costlessly identifying
the type of agent. For example, imagine two stockbrokers: "Churn-and-burn" and
"Buy-and-hold". Buy-and-hold tends to offer relatively superior long-run returns
to clients than does Churn-and-burn, however prospective clients are not able
readily to observe this difference. In other words, the different earnings prospects
of the two brokers is not readily apparent from their financial statements or
other generally available information. Thus. the contractual environment is one
characterized by informational asymmetry.
The ability of the principals, in this context the clients, to make optimal (i.e.
wealth maximizing) investment decisions is a function of their ability to distinguish between the two agents, in this context the two brokers. "Buy-and-hold"
must in some way signal unambiguously to investors that he/she is superior to
"Chum-and Bum".

With this signalling solution to adverse-selection-type agency problems. the
challenge is for the "good" agent to devise a signal that cannot be mimicked by the
"bad" agent. In addition, this signal must not be sO costly that it is uneconomic for
even the good agent to emit. If the good agent is able to devise and emit such a signal
then it engenders what agency theorists term a separating equilibrium in which
the two agents become distinguishable to principals and thus the informational
asymmetry is overcome. If such a signal does not exist. then the informational
asymmetry endures and a pooling equilibrium ensues (Spence, 1976).
Even if a separating equilibrium is achieved, however, there are llenerallv
costs involved. Whatever form the signal takes. the "good" agent bear; the co;t
of emitting the signal. In other words, if there had been no initial infonnational
asymmetry or if the "bad" agent chose openly to reveal its type, then the bad
agent would be no worse off and the good agent would be better off through
not having to fund the signal. Formally. the equilibrium is said to be second-best
because there is a deadweight or "dissipative" cost levied on the economy in
aggregate (a cost to the good agent not recouped by the bad agent). Jensen and
Meckling (1976) label this deadweight cost the "residual loss"; it results directly
from the contractual enforcement problem between principal and agent. Thus,
agency problems, even if they are overcome, are not zero-sum games. We are not
dealing merely with a redistribution of wealth from principal to agent, but rather
with an absolute wealth luss to the el:onomy in aggregate. This absolute wealth
loss is a direct result of the bad firm's pursuit of self-interest "with if necessary
guile and deceit" (Noreen. 1988. p. 359). Note that in equilibrium the bad firm
does not benefit from this opportunistic behavior. Indeed, as part of the economy,
it too suffers the consequences of the dead-weight loss.
Reputation or signalling. therefore, may work as contractual enforcement
mechanisms in some stages of some contractual situations. But the above studies
indicate that there are many environments in which they will not work, or at least
not work costlessly. Furthermore, in equilibrium, the cost is invariably borne by
the agent. Thus, once again, agents do not benefit from opportunistic behavior;
wealth maximization is not achieved, either for the' individual or the aggregate.
In a broader context, Bowie makes a similar observation; "It only pays to lie or
cheat when you can free ride off the honesty of others ... The conscious pursuit
of self-interest by all members of society has the collective result of undermining
the interests of all" (1991, pp. 11-12).
Economic game theory, therefore, provides no nonnative justification for
viewing financial-economic rationality as a behavioral ideal. An economy
populated with agents adhering strictly to the above six axioms of rationality
would, at best, be an inefficient economy; and would, at worst, degenerate into
what the Eighteenth Century moral philosopher Thomas Hobbes called a "war of
all against all" in which life is "nasty, brutish, and short"!
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4. WHY THE "RATIONAL" AGENT CANNOT BE
VIEWED AS A MORAL IDEAL
In the case of economic efficiency, this paper has made clear that opportunistic
agents inevitably engender equilibria that are inefficient in that wealth is not
maximized either for the agents involved or for the economy in aggregate. The
equilibria are "second-best". But, regardless of their economic efficiency, are
economically "rational" agents morally desirable?
Even the most cursory review of ethical theory reveals that this notion of rationality as essentially economic opportunism is not a favorable behavioral attribute.
About the best moral defense that one could make is that it is harmless: it is merely
a behavioral assumption that expedites finance theory and has no impact on actual
behavior. But, as we've already seen, even within their theoretical constructs these
agents are not harmless in that they levy a cost on the financial system. More importantly from a moral perspective, several recent empirical studies find evidence that
these behavioral assumptions have influence beyond the boundaries of financial
modelling. These studies find that the assumptions of financial theory influence
financial practice: "is" does indeed imply "ought". For example, from his experience as a business professor, Norman Bowie supplies anecdotal evidence that
exposure to this narrow rationality paradigm and related rubrics modifies behavior:
"They [MBA students] believe that they will have to be unethical to keep their
jobs. They believe that everyone else will put their [own] interests first" (p. 9). But
he goes on to note that "the evidence here is not merely anecdotal ... economics
graduate students are more inclined to behave in a self-interested fashion" (p. 9).
For example, in one recent study involving 267 prisoners' -dilemma~type
scenarios, economics students defected (i.e. failed to cooperate) 60% of the time,
while non-economists defected only 30% of the time. Also, when compared to
students in different disciplines, economics students were found to be less honest
in hypothetical situations, and both economics students and professors were found
to be less likely to donate to charity (Frank, Gilovieh & Regan, 1993). Bowie
observes that "people change their behavior when confronted with assumptions
about how other people behave" (1991, p. 9). In Challenging The Egoistic
Paradigm, he concludes that "[I]ooking out for oneself is a natural. powerful
motive that needs little, if any, social reinforcement ... Altruistic motives, even if
they too are natural, are not as powerful: they need to be socially reinforced and
nurtured" (p. 19). Such nurturing is not to be found in the behavioral assumptions
of finance.
In a broader context, the susceptibility and suggestibility of human behavior
was made very clear in the famous laboratory experiments conducted by Stanley
Milgram. In these experiments volunteers were asked to administer progressively

stronger electric shocks to some individual. Even though these volunteers could
see the "victim" in considerable distress from the shocks, the volunteers were
generally willing to administer ever higher voltages given the encouragement of
an "authority figure". Milgram concluded that:
Ordinary people. simply doing their jobs. and without any particular hostility on their part.
can becom.: agents in a terrible destructive process ... even when the destructive effects of
their work become patently clear. and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with
fundamental standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to resist
authority (1974, p. 6).

Similarly, Gregory Dees argues that the value systems of business theory influence
those of business practice. He observes that "how concepts are introduced in an
academic setting can have a significant influence on their use later on" (1992,
p. 38). While conunenting on the value system underlying business theory,
Ronald Duska notes that "as it gets accepted as a legitimating reason for certain
behavior in our form of life, it becomes subtly self-fulfilling" (1992, p. 149).
Thus, the behavioral finance paradigm presents itself as morally neutral, but
fails to recognize that its narrow and rigid invocation of self-interest has moral
implications. Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar point:
Managers themselves and most writers about management conceive of themseh'es as morally
neutral characters whose skills enable them to devise the most efficient means of achieving
whatever end is proposed. Whether a given manager is effective or not is in the dominant view
a quite different question from that of the morality of the ends which his effectiveness serves
or fails to serve. Nonetheless there are strong grounds for rejecting the claim that effectiveness
is a morally neutral value (1984, p. 74).

Models developed within the behavioral finance paradigm, therefore, do not
merely endeavor to explain observed phenomena. They do not present merely
a morally neutral perspective. To a significant degree they promote a rationality
concept that lacks a defensible moral foundation.

S. CONCLUSION
Behavioral finance does not merely describe financial market reality, it shapes it.
Economic rationality is taken as the ideal toward to which individuals "should"
strive. In this paper I show that, as a behavioral ideal, economic rationality is
unjustified both from a strictly economic perspective, and from a moral perspective.
By assuming away other motivations and thus elevating wealth-maximization
to the status of a necessary law of nature, behavioral finance may be sanctioning behavior that society at large regards as, at best, morally questionable, and,
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at worst, strictly immoral. In the corporate milieu, by assuming unbridled selfinterest, behavioral finance promotes unbridled self-interest. Furthennore, even if
empirical evidence were to overwhelmingly support wealth maximization as the
dominant motivation among contemporary economic agents (which. as we've just
seen, it does not), behavioral finance's nonnative dimension would still obligate it
to consider alternatives.
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